This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or 't Hooft's Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the nosignaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of 1-randomness introduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Löf, Schnorr, and others.
Introduction
'Quantum mechanics commands much respect. But an inner voice tells me that it is not Mr. Right. The theory delivers a lot, but it hardly brings us closer to the mystery of the Old Man. Anyway, I'm sure he does not play dice. (Einstein to Born, 1926) . 1 'In our scientific expectations we have grown antipodes. You believe in God playing dice and I in perfect laws in the world of things existing as real objects, which I try to grasp in a wildly speculative way.' (Einstein to Born, 1944) . 2 Einstein's idea of 'perfect laws' that should in particular be deterministic is also central to 't Hooft's view of physics, as exemplified by his intriguing Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics ('t Hooft, 2016) . The aim of this paper is to provide arguments against this view, 3 but even if these turn out to be unsuccessful I hope to contribute to the debate about the issue of determinism versus randomness by providing a broad view of the latter. 4 My point of view is that, as argued in §2, randomness is a family resemblance in the sense of Wittgenstein (Sluga, 2006) , but a special one that is always defined through its anti-pole, which may change according to the specific use of the term.
The anti-pole defining which particular notion of randomness is meant may vary even within quantum mechanics, and here two main candidates arise ( §3): one is determinism, as emphatically meant by Born (1926) and most others who claim that randomness is somehow 'fundamental' in quantum theory, but the other is compressibility or any of the other equivalent notions defining what is called 1-randomness in mathematics as its antipole (see Appendix B for an explanation of this). The interplay between these different notions of randomness is the topic of §5, in which I argue that one cannot eat one's cake and have it, in the sense of having a deterministic hidden variable theory underneath quantum mechanics that is strictly compatible with the Born rule. I also argue, more wildly, that Einstein's prohibition of superluminal signaling should be demoted from an absolute to a statistical law, much as the second law of thermodynamics. This analysis relies on an in-depth (re)view of the Born rule, presented in Appendix A.
Randomness as a family resemblance
'The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term.' (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, § §19-20).
'I'm saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all -but there are many kinds of affinity between them. (. . . ) we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family -build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth -overlap and crisscross in the same way.' (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § §65-67).
Though he did not mention it himself, randomness seems a prime example of a phenomenon Wittgenstein would call a 'family resemblance'. 5 Independently, as noted by historians Lüthy & Palmerino (2016) on the basis of examples from antiquity and medieval thought, 6 the various different meanings of randomness (or chance) can all be identified by their antipole. Combining these ideas, I submit that randomness is not just any old Wittgensteinian family resemblance, but a special one that is always defined negatively.
• To begin with, in Aristotle's famous example of a man who goes to the market and walks into his debtor, the randomness of the encounter derives from the fact that the man did not go the the market in order to meet his debtor (but instead went there to buy food). Similarly for the man who digs a hole in his garden to plant a tree and finds a treasure. Even the birth of female babies (and certain other 'chance substances' for which he literally uses the Greek word for 'monsters') was identified by The Philosopher as a failure of purpose in Nature. Thus what actually happened in all these examples was accidental because (as we would say it) it was not intended, or, in Aristotelian parlance, because there was no final cause. By the same token, Aristotle found the atomistic cosmos of Democritus "random" because it was purposeless, ridiculing him for making the cosmic order a product of chance.
• In contrast, half a century later Epicurus found the atomic world not random at all and introduced randomness through the 'swerve', immortalized by Lucretius:
'When the atoms are traveling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so little from their course, just so much that you can call it a change of direction. If it were not for this swerve, everything would fall downwards like raindrops through the abyss of space. No collision would take place and no impact of atom on atom would be created. Thus nature would never have created anything.' (De Rerum Natura, Book II). 7 This was, so to speak, the first complaint against determinism (the goal of Epicurus/Lucretius was to make room for free will in a world otherwise seen as effectively dead because of the everlasting sequence of cause and effect), and indeed, in the context of our analysis, the key point is that the swerve is random because it is 'indeterminate', or because the atoms depart from their natural straight course.
• Neither of these classical meanings is at all identical with the dominant usage from medieval times to the early 20th century, which was exemplified by Spinoza, who claimed that not only miracles, but also circumstances that have concurred by chance are reducible to ignorance of the true causes of phenomena, for which ultimately the will of God ('the sanctuary of ignorance') is invoked as a placeholder. 8 Thus Spinozist randomness lies in the absence of full knowledge of the entire causal chain of events.
• In the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, 9 the latter, speaking for Newton, meant involuntariness by randomness, which constraint he and Newton, against Leibniz, denied at least God could have. Leibniz, on the other hand, in some sense ahead of his time (yet in another following Epicurus/Lucretius), used the word 'random' to designate the absence of a determining cause-a possibility which he (unlike Epicurus/Lucretius) denied on the basis of his principle of sufficient reason. 10 This is clear from an interesting passage which is not widely known and predates Laplace:
'One sees then that everything proceeds mathematically -that is, infallibly -in the whole wide world, so that if someone could have sufficient insight into the inner parts of things, and in addition has remembrance and intelligence enough to consider all the circumstances and to take them into account, he would be a prophet and would see the future in the present as in a mirror.' 11
• Arbuthnot, a younger contemporary and follower of Newton, may have been the first author to explicitly address the role of randomness in the deterministic setting of Newtonian physics. In the Preface to his translation of Huygens's path-breaking book De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae on probability theory, 12 he wrote:
'It is impossible for a Die, with such determin'd force and direction, not to fall on such determin'd side, only I don't know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin'd side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of Art.'
And similarly, but highlighting the alleged negativity of the concept even more:
8 See Ethics, Part I, Appendix. 9 See also Lüthy & Palmerino (2016), §2.7 for part of the following analysis. The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence is available in many editions, such as Vailati (1997) , and the online edition Bennett (2017) . 10 Hacking (1990, Ch. 2) calls this the doctrine of necessity and shows it pervaded early modern thought. 11 The German original is quoted and referenced by Cassirer (1936) : 'Hieraus sieht man nun, das alles mathematisch, d.i. ohnfehlbar zugehe in der ganzen weiten Welt, so gar, dass wenn einer eine genugsame Insicht in die inneren Teile der Dinge haben könnte, und dabei Gedächtnis und Verstand genug hätte, um alle Umstände vor zu nehmen und in Rechnung zu bringen, würde er ein Prophet sein, und in dem Gegenwärtigen das Zukünftige sehen, gleichsam als in einem Spiegel.' English translation by the author. 12 The Latin original De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae is from 1657 and Arbuthnot's English translation On the Laws of Chance appeared in 1692. The quotation is taken from Diaconis & Skyrms (2018), p. 9.
'Chance, in atheistical writings or discourse, is a sound utterly insignificant: It imports no determination to any mode of Existence; nor in deed to Existence itself, more than to non existence; it can neither be defined nor understood; nor can any Proposition concerning it be either affirmed or denied, excepting this one, "That it is a mere word."' (De Moivre, 1718). 13 So this is entirely in the medieval spirit, where ignorance-this time relative to Newton's physics as the ticket to full knowledge-is seen as the origin of randomness.
• A century later, and like Arbuthnot and De Moivre in a book on probability theory (Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, from 1814), Laplace portrayed his demon to make the point that randomness arises in the absence of such an intellect: 14 'An intelligence which could comprehend all the forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composedan intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis-it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as well as the past, would be present to its eyes.'
Note that Leibniz' prophet appeals to the logical structure of the universe that makes it deterministic, whereas Laplace's intelligence knows (Newtonian) physics. 15 In any case, it is important to note that Laplacian randomness is defined within a deterministic world, 16 so that its anti-pole is not indeterminism but full knowledge (and computing power, etc.). Indeed, less well known than the above quotation is the following one, from the very same source:
'All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun.' 17
• The ignorance interpretation of randomness and chance still lurks behind the probabilities introduced in the 19th century in statistical mechanics, which in my view were therefore wholeheartedly construed in the medieval and early modern sprit. 18 13 Quoted by Hacking (1990, p. 13) Strien (2014) argues that Laplace also falls back on Leibniz (and gets the physics wrong by not mentioning the momenta that the intelligence should know, too, besides the forces and positions).
16 Famously: 'The world W is Laplacian deterministic just in case for any physically possible world W ′ , if W and W ′ agree at any time, then they agree at all time.' (Earman, 1986, p. 13) . 17 Quoted by Hacking (1990) , p. 11. 18 It is often maintained that these probabilities are objective, which might cast doubt over the idea that they originate in ignorance. I personally find the distinction between "objective" and "subjective" chances quite unhelpful in the context of fundamental physics, a left-over from (by now) irrelevant and outdated attempts to define probabilities "objectively" as relative frequencies (see also Appendix B) as opposed to interpreting them "subjectively" as credencesà la Ramsey. For example, Loewer (2001 Loewer ( , 2004 claims that the probabilities in statistical mechanics are objective and are as objective as those in quantum mechanics. But both are predicated on a subjective choice of observables, based on ignoring microscopic and quantum-mechanical degrees of freedom, respectively. Given that choice, the probabilities are subsequently objective, but the choice itself is surely subjective (see also Heisenberg quoted in §3 below). Instead of a pointless table-tennis game between "objective" and "subjective", a better term would be "perspectival". For example, I agree with Rovelli (2017) that time's arrow is perspectival (and hence is not "objective"). See also Jaynes (1985) , pp. 118-120, for similar comments on terminology in philosophy of probability.
• Hacking (1990) explains how the doctrine of necessity began to erode in the 19th century, largely through the use of statistics in population studies and biology. 19 In philosophy, the century culminated in the famous words of Peirce (1892, p. 337):
'I believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all the important reasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity, and shown their nullity. (. . . ) If my argument remains unrefuted, it will be time, I think, to doubt the absolute truth of the principle of universal law.'
This partly paved the way for the claim of irreducible randomness in quantum mechanics, although the influence of population studies and biology on intrinsic developments in physics should perhaps not be overestimated. However, the insight that probability and statistics gave rise to their own laws (as opposed to the fear that randomness is pretty much the same as lawlessness), which partly dated back to the previous two centuries (Hacking, 2006 ), surely made quantum theory possible.
• The randomness of variations in heritable traits that were introduced almost simultaneously with the rise of statistical physics in Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection meant something completely different from Laplace etc., best expressed by the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky a century later (Merlin, 2010) :
'Mutations are random changes because they occur independently of whether they are beneficial or harmful.'
Indeed, both historically and actually, the anti-pole to Darwin's randomness of variations is Lamarck's goal-orientedness thereof, 20 intended to strengthen the species (like the proverbial sons of the blacksmith who according to Lamarck inherit his strong muscles). In particular, it does not matter if the variations are of known or unknown origin, or fall under a deterministic or an indeterministic kind of physics.
• Continuing our detour into biology, the well-known Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium law in population genetics, which gives the relative frequencies of alleles and genotypes in a given (infinite) population, is based on the assumption of random mating. This means that mating takes place between pairs of individuals who have not selected each other on the basis of their genetic traits (i.e. there is no sexual selection).
• Eagle (2005, p. 775-776) proposes that 'randomness is maximal unpredictability' (which agrees with criterion 3 below for binary strings), and argues that this is equivalent to a random event being 'probabilistically independent of the current and past states of the system, given the probabilities supported by the theory.'
• Most people, especially those without scientific training, 21 asked to mention a random event they have encountered, typically mention what is called a coincidence. This notion goes back at least to Aristotle, but a modern definition is the following:
19 Though also inspired by the eventual rise of quantum mechanics, Kern (2004) gives a completely different history of causality and uncertainty in the 19th and 20th centuries, tracking the changing explanatory roles of these factors in the the study of murder as documented by more than a hundred novels. 20 As such, Spinoza's philosophical analysis, modern physics, and (evolutionary) biology all contributed to the downfall of the Aristotelian (and subsequently Christian) final causes my analysis started from. 21 Though Stephen Hawking was not adverse to the fact that he was born on January 8th, 1942, exactly 300 years after the death of Galileo Galilei, and, had he been able to note it, would undoubtedly have rejoiced in the equally remarkable fact that he died in 2018 on the birthday of Albert Einstein (March 14).
'A coincidence is a surprising concurrence of events, perceived as meaningfully related, with no apparent causal connection.' (Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989 , p. 853). 22 The subjective nature of this definition (as in 'surprising', 'perceived', 'meaningful', and 'apparent') may repel the scientist, but ironically, the aim of this definition is to debunk coincidences. Because of the contrast between coincidences in daily life we are now talking about and coincidences in the physical setting of bipartite correlation experimentsà la ERR-Bohm-Bell, it is interesting to briefly recall how most if not all everyday coincidences can be rejected on the basis of the above definition: 23 1. The concurrence of events was not at all as surprising as initially thought. This argument is either based on the inability of most people to estimate probabilities correctly (as in the well-known birthday problem), or, if the events were really unlikely, on what Diaconis and Mosteller call the law of truly large numbers: 24 'Rare events occur with high frequency in the presence of large numbers of events'.
2. Against first appearances there was a causal connection, either through a common cause or through direct causation. On a par with the first explanation, in daily life this is the second way to debunk coincidences, but in physics it may fail even when the first explanation is unlikely; indeed, the point of Bell's Theorem is of course that both kinds of causation are excluded in the ERR-Bohm-Bell setting! This case will be taken up in §3 and elsewhere in this paper.
• Finally, serving our aim to compare physical and mathematical notions of randomness, I preview the three equivalent definitions of 1-randomness (see Appendix B and references for details) and confirm that also they fit into our general picture. What is being defined here is randomness of binary strings, and our discussion here is so superficial that I will not even distinguish between finite and infinite ones.
1.
A string x is 1-random if its shortest description is x itself, i.e., there exists no lossless compression of x (in the sense of a computer program that outputs x and whose length is shorter than the length of x): thus x is incompressible.
2.
A string x is 1-random if it fails all tests for patterns (within a suitable class).
3.
A string x is 1-random if there exists no successful (computable) gambling strategy on the digits of x; roughly speaking, these digits are unpredictable.
Moving towards the main goal of the paper, I now continue our list of examples (i.e. of the principle that randomness is a family resemblance whose different meanings are always defined negatively through their anti-poles) in the context of quantum mechanics, which is rich enough by itself to provide its own family of different meanings of randomness (all duly defined negatively), although these may eventually be traceable to the above cases. 25 22 Perhaps confusingly, Ramsey (1926) attributes any coincidence to chance and hence would probably even take the Diaconis-Mosteller definition to define a non-coincidence. 23 For details see Landsman (2018) , so far available in Dutch only. In practice it usually does not help to argue that the events in question were not 'meaningfully related', since at that point semi-intellectual opponents will invoke "synchronicities" (Jung, 1952 ) and the like, and leave the domain of science (as Jung himself squarely admitted). Even if one goes along with that, discussions tend to become circular. 24 In a slightly different phrasing this "law" is also called The Improbability Principle (Hand, 2015) . 25 It will be clear from the way I discuss quantum mechanics that this paper will just be concerned
Randomness in quantum mechanics
Already the very first (scholarly) exposition of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics by Born made many of the major points that are still relevant today:
'Thus Schrödinger's quantum mechanics gives a very definite answer to the question of the outcome of a collision; however, this does not involve any causal relationship. One obtains no answer to the question "what is the state after the collision," but only to the question "how probable is a specific outcome of the collision" (in which the quantum-mechanical law of [conservation of] energy must of course be satisfied). This raises the entire problem of determinism. From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity that could causally establish the outcome of a collision in each individual case; however, so far we are not aware of any experimental clue to the effect that there are internal properties of atoms that enforce some particular outcome. Should we hope to discover such properties that determine individual outcomes later (perhaps phases of the internal atomic motions)? Or should we believe that the agreement between theory and experiment concerning our inability to give conditions for a causal course of events is some pre-established harmony that is based on the non-existence of such conditions? I myself tend to relinquish determinism in the atomic world. But this is [also] a philosophical question, for which physical arguments alone are not decisive.' (Born, 1926, p. 866) . 26 Given the fact that Born was the first to discuss such things in the open literature, it is remarkable how perceptive his words are: he marks the opposition of randomness to determinism, recognizes the possibility of hidden variables (with negative advice though), and understands that the issue is not just a technical one. Bravo! Having said this, in line with the previous section our aim is, of course, to confront the anti-pole of determinism with other possible anti-poles to randomness as it is featured by quantum mechanics. The introduction of fundamental probabilities in quantum theory is delicate in many ways, among which is that fact that the Schrödinger equation is even more deterministic than Newton's laws. 27 Hence what is meant is randomness of measurements outcomes; since it is not our aim (here) to solve the measurement problem-for which see Landsman (2017), Chapter 11-I simply assume that i) measurement is a well-defined laboratory practice, and ii) measurements have outcomes. In all that follows, I also accept the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics for these outcomes (which are based on the Born rule reviewed in Appendix A). Even so, the claim of irreducibility of randomness, which is typical for all versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation (and for any mainstream view held by physicists) is almost incomprehensible, since one of the pillars of this interpretation is Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts, according to which the apparatus is described classically; randomness of measurement outcomes is then seen as a consequence of the very definition of a measurement. But this suggests that randomness should be reducible to ignorance about the quantum-mechanical degrees of freedom of the apparatus:
with process randomness, as opposed to product randomness (Eagle, 2005) . There is certainly a distinction between the two, but the former would take us into the quagmire of the measurement problem. 26 Translation by the author. The reference is to the German original. 27 In the sense that the solution is not only uniquely determined by the initial state, but, by Stone's Theorem, even exist for all t ∈ R (in other words, incomplete motion is impossible), cf. Earman (2009).
'these uncertainties (. . . ) are simply a consequence of the fact that we describe the experiment in terms of classical physics.' (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 53) Ironically, Bell's Theorem(s), which arose in opposition to the the Copenhagen Interpretation (Cushing, 1994) , did not only prove Einstein (as the leading opponent of this interpretation) wrong on the issue that arguably mattered most to him (namely locality in the sense defined later in a precise way by Bell), but also proved Bohr and Heisenberg right on the irreducibility of randomness, at least if we grant them randomness per se. Indeed, suppose we equate reducibility of randomness with the existence of a "Laplacian" deterministic hidden variable theory (i.e. use the anti-pole of determinism), and assume, as the Copenhagenists would be pleased to, the conjunction of the following properties:
1. The Born rule and the ensuing statistical predictions of quantum mechanics; 2. Hidden signal-locality (i.e. the impossibility of active superluminal communication if one knows the state λ of the underlying deterministic theory); 28 3. Free will (or free choice), that is, the independence of the choice of measurement settings from the state of the system one measures using these settings, in a broad sense of 'state' that includes the prepared state as well as the 'hidden' state λ. 29 Then both Bell's (1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem imply that such a deterministic hidden variable theory cannot exist, and hence that the Laplacian interpretation of randomness does not apply to quantum mechanics (granting assumptions 1-3). This warrants the Copenhagen claim of irreducible or non-Laplacian or Leibnizian randomness. Viable deterministic hidden variable theories compatible with the Born rule therefore have to choose between giving up either hidden signal-locality or free will. Given this choice, we may therefore distinguish between theories that:
• give up hidden signal-locality, like Bohmian mechanics;
• give up free will, like the cellular automata interpretation of 't Hooft (2016).
In both cases the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are recovered by averaging the hidden variable or state with respect to a probability measure µ ψ on the space Λ of hidden variables, given some (pure) quantum state ψ (which is assumed to be known). The difference is that in the first case the hidden state λ determines the outcomes given the settings, whereas in the second case λ determines the outcomes as well as the settings.
• In Bohmian mechanics the hidden variable is position x, and dµ ψ = |ψ(x)| 2 dx is the Born probability for outcome x with respect to the expansion |ψ = dx ψ(x)|x . 30
• Similarly, in 't Hooft's theory the hidden state n is identified with a basis vector |n in some Hilbert space H, and once again the measure µ ψ (n) = |c n | 2 is given by the Born probability for outcome n with respect to the expansion |ψ = n c n |n .
In Bohmian mechanics ('t Hooft does not need this!) such averaging also restores (surface) signal-locality, i.e., the impossibility of superluminal communication on the basis of actual measurement outcomes (which is a theorem of quantum theory, though a much more delicate one than is usually thought, as I will argue in §5), see also Valentini (2002 My aim is to give a critical assessment of the situation described in the previous section. My analysis is based on the interplay between the single-case probability measure µ on an outcome space X, which for the purpose of this paper will be the Born measure µ = µ a on the spectrum X = σ(a) of some self-adjoint operator a, and hence are provided by theory (see also Appendix A), and the probabilities defined as long-run frequencies for outcome sequences x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) of the Bernoulli process defined by (X, µ), which are given by experiment. To obtain clean mathematical results, I assume experiments can be repeated infinitely often. This is clearly an idealization, which is regulated by Earman's Principle:
'While idealizations are useful and, perhaps, even essential to progress in physics, a sound principle of interpretation would seem to be that no effect can be counted as a genuine physical effect if it disappears when the idealizations are removed.' (Earman, 2004, p. 191) Indeed, finite-size effects would confirm the picture I sketch (see Appendix B), much as the law(s) of large numbers have finite-size approximants like the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound.
In particular, zero probability of some infinite sequence comes down to very low probability for the corresponding finite strings, and probability 1 for infinite sequences amounts to very high probability for finite strings. 32 Thus I use the canonical probability measure µ ∞ on the infinite product space X N of all infinite sequences x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .), where x n ∈ X, and X N are canonically equipped with the cylindrical σ-algebra S ⊂ P(X N ). 33 31 The first four lines of this poem are printed on the last page of Keynes (1921) , without any source. 32 One has to distinguish between outcomes with probability zero and properties that hold with probability zero. Indeed, every single outcome (in the sense of an infinite bitstream produced by a fair quantum coin flip) has probability zero, and hence this property alone cannot distinguish between random outcomes (in whatever sense, e.g. 1-random) and non-random outcomes (such as deterministic outcomes, or, more appropriately in our technical setting, computable ones), or indeed between any kind of different outcomes. On the other hand, not being random is a property that holds with probability zero, in that the set of all outcomes that are not random has probability zero (equivalently, the event consisting of all outcomes that are random happens almost surely, i.e. with probability 1). And yet outcomes with this probability zero property exist and may occur (in the finite case, with very small but positive probability). See also §5. 33 Here P(Y ) denotes the power set of Y . The σ-algebra S is generated by all subsets of the form To see how one may recover or verify µ from the long-term frequencies governed by the product measure µ ∞ , for any function f :
Then (by the ergodic theorem), for any f ∈ C(X), almost surely with respect to µ ∞ ,
times the unit function 1 X N on X N . This is for continuous functions f , but a limit argument extends it to characteristic functions 1 A : X → 2 ≡ {0, 1}, where A ⊂ X, so that
times 1 X N , again µ ∞ -almost surely. If we define the 'probability' of A within some infinite sequence (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) as the relative frequency of A, i.e., as the limit as N → ∞ of the number of x n within (x 1 , . . . , x N ) that lie in A divided by N , then (4.3) states that for almost all sequences in X N with respect to the infinite product measure µ ∞ this 'probability' of A equals its Born probability. This is useful, since the latter is a purely mathematical quantity, whereas the former is experimentally accessible (at least for large
In what follows, I specialize this setting to a fair coin flip, that is, X = 2 = {0, 1} and µ(0) = µ(1) = 1/2. Hence 2 N is the space of infinite binary sequences, equipped with the probability measure µ ∞ induced by µ (as I shall argue in §5 below, this situation cannot in fact arise classically, at least not in a deterministic theory). We have: Theorem 4.1 Almost every binary sequence x ∈ 2 N is 1-random with respect to µ ∞ .
See e.g. Calude (2010), Corollary 6.32. Thus the set E of all sequences that are not 1-random has probability zero, i.e. µ ∞ (E) = 0, but this by no means implies that E is "small" in any other sense: set-theoretically, it is as large as its complement, i.e. the set of all 1-random sequences, which makes it bizarre that (barring a few exceptions related to Chaitin's number Ω) not a single one of these 1-random sequences can actually be proved to be 1-random, cf. Appendix B. Theorem 4.1 has further amazing consequences: Corollary 4.2 With respect to µ ∞ , almost every infinite outcome sequence x of a fair coin flip is Borel normal, 34 incomputable, 35 and contains any finite string infinitely often. 36 This follows because any 1-random sequence has these properties with certainty, see Calude (2010), §6.4. The relevance of Bernoulli processes for quantum theory comes from Theorem 5.1 in the next section, whose second option almost by definition yields these processes.
where An ⊂ X is Borel measurable and N < ∞. The probability measure µ on X then defines a probability measure µ ∞ on S, whose value on B is defined by µ ∞ (B) = N n=0 µ(An). See e.g. Dudley (1989) , especially Theorem 8.2.2, for this and related constructions (due to Kolmogorov) . 34 This means that any group x1 · · · xn of digits in x occurs with relative frequency equal to 2 −n .
Critical analysis and claims
The relevance of the material in the previous section comes from the following result.
Theorem 5.1
The following procedures for repeated identical measurements are equivalent (in giving the same possible outcome sequences with the same probabilities):
1. Quantum mechanics is applied to the whole run (with classically recorded outcomes).
2. Quantum mechanics is just applied to single experiments (with classically recorded outcomes), upon which classical probability theory takes over to combine these.
See Appendix A for the proof, which culminates in eq. (A. 35) , showing that the Born probability µ a for single outcomes induces the Bernoulli process probability µ ∞ a on the space σ(a) N of infinite outcome sequences. As mentioned before, I specialize to fair quantum coin flips producing 50-50 Bernoulli processes, of which there are examples galore: think of measuring the third Pauli matrix σ z = diag(1, −1) in a state like ψ = (1, 1)/ √ 2. In that case, Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 4.2 trivially have the following implication:
Corollary 5.2 With respect to the product measure µ ∞ a coming from the Born measure µ a , almost every infinite outcome sequence x of a fair quantum coin flip is 1-random and therefore Borel normal, incomputable, and contains any finite string infinitely often.
The Born rule therefore implies very strong randomness properties of outcome sequences, albeit merely with probability one (i.e. almost surely) with respect to µ ∞ a . This makes it pointless to try and prove that outcome sequences of quantum measurements are 1-random: firstly, many sequences are not, and secondly, of those that are, the property is (generically) unprovable. 37 In any case, in the spirit of our general philosophy of randomness it is natural to compare randomness of infinite measurement outcome sequences as defined by: 38 1. 1-randomness (with compressible sequences as its anti-pole), as suggested by the Born rule and the above analysis of its mathematical implications; 39 2. indeterminism, as suggested by Born himself, and in his wake also by Bell's Theorem and the Free Will Theorem (seen as proofs of indeterminism under assumptions 1-3).
To make this comparison precise, we once again need the case distinction between hidden variable theories giving up hidden signal-locality like Bohmian mechanics and those giving up free will, like 't Hooft's theory. In the usual EPR-Bohm-Bell setting, let (x, y) be the outcome for given settings (a, b) ∈ k × k (assuming each setting can take k possible values, typically k = 2 or k = 3), where (x, a) are Alice's and (y, b) are Bob's (outcomes, settings).
37 See Abbott et al (2019) and Kovalsky et al (2018) for empirical tests of approximate 1-randomness. 38 In the literature on quantum cryptography and quantum random number generators (QRNG) one also find notions of ("free") randomness for single qubits, see e.g. the reviews Brunner et al (2019), HerreroCollantes & Garcia-Escartin (2017), Ma et al (2016) , and Pironio (2018). The two (closely related) definitions used there fall into our general scheme of anti-polarity, namely randomness as unpredictability defined as minimizing the probability that an eavesdropper correctly guesses the qubit, and randomness as the absence of correlations between the qubit in question and anything outside its forward lightcone (which is heavily Leibnizian). These are related, since guessing is done through such correlations of the qubit. Certification of both cryptographic protocols and QRNGs is defined in these terms, backed by proofs of indeterminismà la Bell, so that in all versions non-locality plays a crucial role.
39 I am by no means the first to relate quantum theory to algorithmic randomness: see, for example, Bendersky et al (2014, 2016, 2017) , Calude (2004) , Svozil (1993 Svozil ( , 2018 , Senno (2017) , Yurtsever (2001) , and Zurek (1989) . The way my work relates to some of these references will become clear in due course.
• In Bohmian mechanics, narrowed down to the above context, one may regard the hidden state λ ∈ Λ as a function λ(a, b) = (x, y) that determines the outcome from the settings, which are supposed to be "freely chosen", and hence are given independently of λ. If we number the consecutive runs of the experiment by n ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, then the outcome sequence is determined by some function
that gives the value λ n ∈ Λ of the hidden state as well as the settings (a n , b n ), from which the outcome (x n , y n ) follows. It will be useful to split f = (f 1 , f 2 ) into two parts, where λ n = f 1 (n) for some f 1 : N → Λ, and likewise (a n , b n ) = f 2 (n).
• In 't Hooft's theory, λ determines all of (a, b, x, y) = (a(λ), b(λ), x(λ), y(λ)), but the settings (a, b) do not determine the outcome (x, y); one needs to know λ for this. In this case, the outcome sequence is therefore simply determined by a function
A key point in the analysis of these functions f and g is the requirement that both theories reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics given through the Born rule relative to some pure state ψ. As already noted, this is achieved by requiring that λ is averaged with respect to some probability measure µ ψ on Λ. If the experimental run is to respect this averaging, as it has to if its long-run frequencies are to reproduce the quantum-mechanical ones, then the maps f 1 and g must be 'typical' for the Born-like measure µ ψ (cf. Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992; Callender, 2007; Norsen, 2018) which seems to mean that (the range of) f 1 and g should pass sufficiently many statistical tests based on µ ψ (such as the law of large numbers). Technically, I would say that the samplings from Λ must be 1-random, assuming we use the tests used in the second definition of 1-randomness in §2, which include all the usual ones (Li & Vitányi, 2008, §2.4). 40 Anything deterministic, like computable samplings, will only contribute output sequences that are atypical for µ ψ : even the set of all such sequences has measure zero. 41 The requirement that the functions f 1 and g randomly sample µ ψ necessarily introduces an element of randomness into the hidden variable theories in question, which seems somewhat at odds with their deterministic character. Indeed, there are two possibilities:
• This sampling is provided by the hidden variable theory. In that case, the above argument shows that the theory must contain an irreducibly random ingredient.
• The sampling is not provided by the theory. In that case, the theory fails to determine the outcome of any specific experiment and just provides averages of outcomes. 40 We only defined 1-randomness for outcome sequences of fair coin flips, but the definition can be extended to other measures, see Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010) , §6.12 and references therein. 41 In this light I draw attention to an important result of Senno (2017), Theorem 3.2.7, see also Bendersky et al (2017), which is entirely consistent with the above analysis: If the functions f1 and g are computable (within a computable time bound), then Alice and Bob can signal superluminally. In other words, where mathematically speaking averaging the hidden state over the probability measure µ ψ suffices to guarantee (surface) signal-locality even in a theory without hidden signal-locality (Valantini, 2002) , if this averaging is done by sampling Λ in a long run of repeated measurements, then this sampling must at least be incomputable. If not, the mathematical averaging is not reproduced, to one's detriment.
Either way, like standard (Copenhagen Interpretation) quantum mechanics the hidden variable theory cannot be deterministic, and the question is what has been gained. Surely, the source of indeterminism has been shifted: in Copenhagen quantum mechanics it is in the outcomes of experiments whereas in 'deterministic' hidden variable theories it is in the assignment of the hidden variable to each run of the experiment, i.e. in the sampling of the Born-like measure µ ψ , but since in both Bohmian mechanics and 't Hooft's theory this measure literally is the Born measure while in Copenhagen quantum mechanics the outcomes of experiments equally well sample the Born measure, the difference between the two cases is almost metaphysical. Therefore, it would be fair to say that truly deterministic hidden variable theories compatible with the Born rule do not exist.
It is instructive to compare this with classical coin tossing, in which the role of the hidden state is played by the initial conditions (cf. Diaconis & Skyrms, 2018, Chapter 1, Appendix 2). The 50-50 chances making the coin fair should be obtained by averaging over the initial conditions, i.e., by sampling with respect to a suitable probability distribution. By the above argument, this sampling cannot be done deterministically, for otherwise the outcome sequences appropriate to a fair coin do not obtain: it must be done in a genuinely random way. This is impossible classically, so that fair classical coins do not exist (as confirmed by the experiments of Diaconis c.s., see Diaconis & Skyrms (2018) , Chapter 1).
In response to this argument, both the Bohmians and 't Hooft go for the second option and blame the randomness in question on the initial conditions, 42 whose specification is indeed usually seen as lying outside the range of a deterministic theory. 43 As explained by both parties (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992; 't Hooft, 2016), the randomness in the outcomes of measurement on quantum system, including the Born rule, is a direct consequence of the above randomness in initial conditions. But in a Laplacian deterministic theory one can either predict or retrodict and these procedures should be equivalent; so within the context of a deterministic hidden variable theory of the kinds under discussion, Copenhagen attributing the origin of randomness to the outcomes of measurement and our hidden variable theorists attributing it to the initial conditions for measurement, are equivalent. This makes it impossible to regard the hidden variable theories in question as deterministic underpinnings of (Copenhagen) quantum mechanics, as they are intended. 44 Bohmians (but not 't Hooft) even have an additional problem, namely the function f 2 : N → n × n that provides the measurement settings. This is left outside the theory, but Bohmians still have to account for both the 'freedom' of choosing these settings and their randomness (which for example is used in all arguments around Bell's Theorem, cf. Esfeld, 2015). Bell tried to kill two birds with the same stone by saying that the settings had to be 'at least effectively free for the purpose at hand', and clarifying this as follows: 45 42 Indeed, N runs of the same experiment need not be done subsequently but can be done simultaneously. 43 The Bohmians seem to be split on the origin of the quantum equilibrium distribution, compare e.g. Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi (1992) with Colin & Valentini (2014) . See also Callender (2007) and Norsen (2018) . Let me emphasize that the origin of µ ψ or its dependence on µΨ is not my concern here; the problem I address is the need to randomly sample it and the justification for doing so. 44 A different point was made by Pauli (1953, p. 38) against the pilot wave theory of De Broglie: 'The hypothesis of a general probability distribution for the hidden variables that is determined by the single [wave] function ψ is not justified from the point of view of a deterministic scheme: it is borrowed from a theory which is based on the totally different hypothesis that the [wave] function provides a complete description of the system.' I am indebted to Anthony Valentini and Guido Bacciagaluppi for this reference. 45 The source is Bell (1985) , p. 105, which corresponds to p. 86 of the reprinted version in Bell, Gottfried, and Veltman (2001). The author learnt it from the talk by Tim Maudlin at the 't Hooft 2019 conference.
'Suppose that the instruments are set at the whim, not of experimental physicists, but of mechanical random generators. (. . . ) Could the input of such mechanical devices be reasonably be regarded as sufficiently free for the purpose at hand? I think so. Consider the extreme case of a "random" generator which is in fact perfectly deterministic in nature and, for simplicity, perfectly isolated. In such a device the complete final state perfectly determines the complete initial state-nothing is forgotten. And yet for many purposes, such a device is precisely a "forgetting machine". (. . . ) To illustrate the point, suppose that the choice between two possible [settings], corresponding to a and a ′ , depended on the oddness of evenness of the digit in the millionth decimal place of some input variable. Then fixing a or a ′ indeed fixes something about the input-i.e., whether the millionth digit is odd or even. But this peculiar piece of information is unlikely to be the vital piece for any distinctly different purpose, i.e., it is otherwise rather useless. 
.1 This implies that
Bohmian mechanics (as well as other deterministic hidden variable theories that leaves the settings free) requires even more randomness than the sampling of the (Born) probability measure µ ψ , which further undermines the claim that it is a deterministic theory.
The analysis given so far focused on the necessity of correctly sampling a probability measure µ: if, so far in the context of hidden variable theories, where µ = µ ψ , this is not done correctly, quantum-mechanical predictions such as signal-locality may be threatened. But in general there are measurement outcome sequences that fail to sample µ: events with very low or even zero probability can and do occur. This is even the whole point of the "law of truly large numbers" quoted in §2, which is true for infinite sequences, but may be clearer for (very) long finite sequences, where (in the spirit of Earman's Principle) zero probability is replaced by very low probability. In general, the no-signaling (or signallocality) property of quantum mechanics states that the probability
is independent of b, where P ψ (x, y | a, b) is the Born probability that measurement of observables determined by the settings a and b give outcomes x and y. Indeed, we have
where ψ |A is the restriction of the state ψ on B(H A ⊗H B ) to Alice's part B(H A ). Similarly, the Born probability P ψ (y | a, b) should be independent of a and in fact equals P ψ |B (y | b).
However, I have repeatedly noted that the empirical probability extracted from a long measurement outcome sequence coincides with the corresponding Born probability only almost surely with respect to the induced probability measure on the space of outcome sequences, and hence outliers violating the property (5.5) exist (for finite sequences even with positive probability 
It is easy to show that the conjunction of predictability and signal-locality implies factorization and hence, for random settings, the Bell (CHSH) inequalities, and therefore for suitable states ψ this conjunction contradicts the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics as expressed by the Born rule. Accepting the latter, signal-locality therefore implies unpredictability and hence some (very weak) form of randomness. There are many other results in this direction, ranging from e.g. Barrett This argument is just heuristic, since the terms are used differently in both cases: to prove (5.8) one typically uses Born probabilities and other theoretical entities, whereas for (5.9) I use probabilities obtained from outcome sequences as limiting relative frequencies: (5.9) then comes from low-probability sequences that violate (5.5), which is satisfied with probability one by sufficiently random sequences. Indeed, this difference is the whole point:
signal-locality is a statistical property, like the second law of thermodynamics. 49 47 Note that the aim of Barrett, Kent, & Hardy (2005) is to prove security of some quantum key distribution protocol on the basis of signal-locality even if quantum mechanics turns out to be incorrect, whereas the present paper investigates the role of statistical outliers assuming quantum mechanics is correct. These aims are closely related, of course, since too many (how many?) outliers may make one question the theory. 48 See Hermens (2019) for arguments for (5.8) and (5.9) even without assuming free choice. 49 Having said this, giving an actual signaling protocol for an outcome sequence (in the EPR-Bohm-Bell setting) that violates (5.5) is highly nontrivial. Yurtsever (2001) gives a protocol for superluminal signaling if the outcome sequence is not 1-random, but his arguments are very hard to follow and the paper with complete details he announces has never appeared. His approach may be neither viable nor necessary, since such a protocol need only exist for outcome sequences violating (5.5), which is a stronger property than violating 1-randomness-since contrapositively 1-randomness implies all averaging properties like (5.5). In fact, further assumptions are necessary in order for Alice to have a chance (sic) to learn Bob's settings b from her part (xn)n of the (double) outcome sequence (xn, yn)n; a complete lack of structure would also make any kind of signaling random. I know of only one such protocol (which, however, should suffice as a "proof of concept"): if the unlikely outcome sequence (xn, yn)n comes from computable functions xn = x(a, b, n) and yn = y(a, b, n) with O(T 2 ) time bounds, then signaling is possible through a learning algorithm for computable functions, see Senno (2017), Theorem 3.2.7 and Bendersky et al (2017). This is the same result as in footnote 41; by Proposition 3.1.7 in Senno (2017), mutatis mutandis it applies both with and without hidden variables. This protocol enables Alice (or Bob) to signal after a finite (but alas unknown and arbitrarily large) number of of measurements (this answers a speculation by Carlo Rovelli that finite-size corrections to the lack of randomness may conspire to prevent superluminal signaling).
A The Born rule revisited
Every argument on probabilities in quantum mechanics relies on the Born rule, which is so natural that it will probably (!) be with us forever. In order to explain its canonical mathematical origin, I use the C*-algebraic approach to quantum theory, which because of its ability to simultaneously talk about commutative and non-commutative algebras (and hence about classical and quantum probabilities) is especially useful in this context. 50 Indeed, the Born rule arises by restricting a quantum state ω on the non-commutative algebra B(H), i.e. the algebra of all bounded operators on some Hilbert space H, to the commutative C*-algebra C * (a) generated by some self-adjoint operator a = a * ∈ B(H) and the unit operator 1 H (so perhaps C * (a, 1 H ) would have been better notation). 51 This view has been inspired by the Copenhagen Interpretation, in that the associated probabilities originate in the classical description of a measurement setting, as called for by Bohr. However, precisely because of this, my derivation also seems to undermine the Copenhagen claim of the irreducibility of randomness, which may now clearly be traced back to a voluntary loss of information in passing from an algebra to one of its subalgebras and ignoring the rest (see also §3). The Copenhagen Interpretation will be saved from this inconsistency by a mathematical property that has no classical analog.
As I see it, the Born rule is the quantum-mechanical counterpart of the following elementary construction in measure theory. Let X be a compact Hausdorff space, 52 with associated commutative C*-algebra A = C(X) of complex-valued continuous functions on X. Let f ∈ A be real-valued and denote its (automatically closed) range in R by σ(f ); the notation is justified by the fact that the spectrum of a self-adjoint operator in quantum theory is analogous to σ(f ) in every possible way. Let ω be a state on A, or, equivalently (by the Riesz representation theorem), a probability measure µ on X, related to ω by
The state ω then also defines a probability measure µ f on the 'spectrum' σ(f ) through
where ∆ ⊆ σ(f ) and f ∈ ∆ or f −1 (∆) denotes the subset {x ∈ X | f (x) ∈ ∆} of X. Virtually all of probability theory is based on this construction, which I now rephrase. For any C*-algebra A with unit 1 A , let C * (a) be the smallest C*-algebra in A (under the same operations and norm) that contains a and the unit 1 A , as above for A = B(H). If a * = a, then C * (a) is the norm-closure of the set of all (finite) polynomials in a. Take A = C(X) and f ∈ C(X), assumed real-vaued (since f * = f ). This gives as isomorphism
where f ∈ C(X), g ∈ C(σ(f )), as follows from the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem. 51 This is well defined, since C * (a) is just the intersection of all C*-algebras in A that contain a and 1A. 52 With some modifications the construction easily generalizes to the locally compact case. 53 if K ⊂ R is compact, then polynomials on K are dense in C(K) for the supremum-norm, i.e. the norm on C(X). To prove that (A.3) -(A.4) is an isomorphism of C*-algebras one may therefore start with polynomial functions g (taking K = σ(f )) and finish with a continuity argument.
If C is a C*-subalgebra of A with the same unit as A, then any state ω on A defines a state ω |C on C. Thus ω |C * (f ) is a state on C * (f ). Furthermore, if ϕ : B → C is a unital homomorphism of unital C*-algebras (i.e., a linear map preserving all operations as well as the unit-in our case ϕ is even an isomorphism), and if ω ′ is a state on C, then ϕ * ω ′ = ω ′ • ϕ is a state on B. Using (A.3) -(A.4), I apply this construction to
where S(A) is the state space of A, so that a state ω on C(X) defines a state ω ′ on C(σ(f )).
Once again using the Riesz representation theorem then turns ω ′ into a probability measure µ ′ on σ(f ); and this is exactly the probability measure µ f = µ ′ defined in (A.2). Copying this reasoning for quantum mechanics mutatis mutandis immediately gives the Born measure. Instead of (A.5) -(A.6), for some given a = a * ∈ B(H) I now take
where (A.3) -(A.4) is replaced by the continuous functional calculus (CFC), that is,
Here σ(a) is the spectrum of a, defined as the set of λ ∈ C for which the operator a − λ · 1 H is not invertible in B(H); if dim(H) < ∞, then σ(a) is the set of eigenvalues of a. In most applications the state ω is normal, i.e., given by a density operator ρ on H through ω(a) = Tr (ρa). (A.11)
We then replay our record: a state ω ∈ S(B(H)) restricts to a state ω |C * (a) on C * (a), which is mapped to a state on C(σ(a)) by the CFC, which state in turn is equivalent to a probability measure on σ(a). The probability measure µ a on σ(a) obtained by the above construction is exactly the Born measure, which is more commonly defined as follows: Theorem A.1 Let H be a Hilbert space, let a * = a ∈ B(H), and let ω be a state on B(H). There exists a unique probability measure µ a on the spectrum σ(a) such that
We now return to the issue raised in the introduction to this appendix: even short of hidden variables (see §3), to what extent is the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics that is already inherent in the Born measure reducible to ignorance? From a naive perspective it is, for in the corresponding classical case the measure µ f on σ(f ) does not determine the measure µ on X except when C * (f ) = C(X) (which is certainly possible, take e.g. X = [0, 1] and f (x) = x). However, in the quantum case it so happens that if a is maximal (i.e. its spectrum is nondegenerate, or, equivalently, C * (a) is a maximal commutative C*-subalgebra of B(H)), then the measure µ a on σ(a) does determine the state ω, at least if ω is pure and normal, as in (A.11), despite the fact that C * (a) is just a small part of B(H). So the Copenhagen Interpretation is walking a tightrope here, but it doesn't fall. 54 The Born measure is a mathematical construction; what is its relationship to experiment? This relationship must be the source of the (alleged) randomness of quantum mechanics, for the Schrödinger equation is deterministic. We start by postulating, as usual, that µ a (A) is the (single case) probability that measurement of the observable a in the state ω (that jointly give rise to the pertinent Born measure µ a ) gives a result λ ∈ A ⊂ σ(a). What needs to be clarified in the above statement is the word 'probability'.
Although I do not buy Lewis's (1994) "Best Systems Account" (BSA) of laws of nature, 55 I do agree with his identification of single-case probabilities as numbers (consistent with the probability calculus as a whole) that theory assigns to events, upon which longrun frequencies provide empirical evidence for the theory in question, 56 but do not define probabilities. 57 The Born measure is a case in point: these probabilities are theoretically given, but have to be empirically verified by long runs of independent experiments. In other words, by the results reviewed below such experiments provide numbers whose role it is to test the Born rule as a hypothesis. This is justified by (4.3) in §4, which equates probabilities computed from long-run frequencies with the corresponding single-case probabilities that define the clause "with probability one" under which (4.3) holds, and without which clause the limit in (4.3) would be undefined. As explained in § §4-5, the relevance of (4.3) to quantum physics comes from Theorem 5.1, which I now prove.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let a = a * ∈ B(H), where H is a Hilbert space and B(H) is the algebra of all bounded operators on H, and let σ(a) be the spectrum of a. For simplicity (and since this is enough for our applications, where H = C 2 ) I assume dim(H) < ∞, so that σ(a) simply consists of the eigenvalues λ i of a (which may be degenerate). Let us first consider a finite number N of runs of an identical measurement of a. The first option in the theorem corresponds to a simultaneous measurement of the commuting operators
all defined on the N -fold tensor product H N ≡ H ⊗N of H with itself. 58 To put this in a broader perspective, consider any set (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ≡ a of commuting operators on any Hilbert space K (of which (A.13) -(A.14) is obviously a special case with K = H N ). These operators have a joint spectrum σ(a), whose elements are the joint eigenvalues λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ N ), defined by the property that there exists a nonzero joint eigenvector ψ ∈ K such that a i ψ = λ i ψ for all i = 1, . . . , N ; clearly,
55 See Loewer (2004) and, concisely, Callender(2007) for summaries of Lewis's BSA. As I understand it, Lewisian laws describe nature, but fail to govern or guide it in the way that the Law of Moses, carved in stone, is supposed to influence (decent) human behaviour. Now I agree with Loewer (2004) that it is hard to see how laws as mathematical expressions in physics books could govern anything, but I expect this problem to be solved in due course by an emergentist account in which lower-level behaviour-though never fundamental-gives rise to emergent laws at some higher substratum of reality. See also footnote 3.
56 Within the Lewisian ideology this is ultimately justified by his Principal Principle, which roughly speaking equates chance as subjective degree of belief (i.e. credence) with objective chance.
57 This, as is well known by now, is a dead end street (Hájek & Hitchcock, 2016) . It should be mentioned though that the fascinating yet ultimately flawed attempts of von Mises to provide such a definition played a decisive role in the road towards algorithmic randomness (van Lambalgen, 1987) . 58 This can even be replaced by a single measurement, see Landsman (2017) , Corollary A.20.
where e
is the spectral projection of a i on the eigenspace for the eigenvalue λ i ∈ σ(a i ). Von Neumann's Born rule for the probability of finding λ ∈ σ(a) then simply reads p a (λ) = ω(e λ ), (A.16) where ω is the state on B(K) with respect to which the Born probability is defined. If dim(K) < ∞, as I assume, we always have ω(a) = Tr (ρa) for some density operator ρ, and for a general Hilbert space K this is the case iff the state ω is normal on B(K). For (normal) pure states we have ρ = |ψ ψ| for some unit vector ψ ∈ K, in which case
The Born rule (A.16) follows from the same reasoning as the single-operator case explained in the run-up to Theorem A.1 (Landsman, 2017, §4.1): 59 we have an isomorphism
of (commutative) C*-algebras, and under this isomorphism the restriction of the state ω, originally defined on B(K), to C * (a) defines a probability measure µ a on the joint spectrum σ(a), which is just the Born measure whose probabilities are given by (A.16). For (A.13) -(A.14) we have equality in (A.15); since in that case σ(a i ) = σ(a), we obtain 19) and, for all λ i ∈ σ(a) and states ω on B(H N ), the Born rule (A.16) becomes
Now take a given state ω 1 on B(H). Reflecting the idea that ω is the state on B(H N ) in which N independent measurements of a ∈ B(H) in the state ω 1 are carried out, choose
the state on B(H N ) defined by linear extension of its action on elementary tensors:
It follows that
so that the joint probability of the outcome (λ 1 , . . . , λ N ) ∈ σ(a) is simply
Since these are precisely the probabilities for option 2 (i.e. the Bernoulli process), i.e., .25) this proves the claim for N < ∞. 59 Moreover, quite apart from te above derivation, the Born rule for multiple commuting operators is in fact a special case of the one for single operators (Landsman, 2017 , §2.5).
To describe the limit N → ∞, let B be any C*-algebra with unit 1 B ; below I take B = B(H), B = C * (a), or B = C(σ(a)). We now take
the N -fold tensor product of B with itself. 60 The special cases above may be rewritten as 29) with N copies of H and σ(a), respectively, and in (A.28) the a i are given by (A.13) -(A.14). We may then wonder if these algebras have a limit as N → ∞. They do, but it is not unique and depends on the choice of observables, that is, of the infinite sequences a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . .), with a N ∈ A N , that are supposed to have a limit. One possibility is to take sequences a for which there exists M ∈ N and a M ∈ A M such that for each N ≥ M , 30) with N − M copies of the unit 1 B . On that choice, one obtains the infinite tensor product B ⊗∞ , see Landsman (2017) , §C.14. The limit of (A.27) in this sense is B(H ⊗∞ ), where H ⊗∞ is von Neumann's 'complete' infinite tensor product of Hilbert spaces, 61 in which C * (a) ⊗∞ is the C*-algebra generated by the operators (a 1 , a 2 , . . .). The limit of (A.29) is
where σ(a) N , which we previously saw as a measure space (as a special case of X N for general compact Hausdorff spaces X), is now seen as a topological space with the product topology, in which it is compact. 62 As in the finite case, we have an isomorphism 32) and hence, on the given identifications,
It follows from the definition of the infinite tensor products used here that each state ω 1 on B defines a state ω ∞ 1 on B ⊗∞ . Take B = B(H) and restrict ω ∞ 1 , which a priori is a state on B(H ⊗∞ ), to its commutative C*-subalgebra C * (a 1 , a 2 , . . .). The isomorphism (A.33) then gives a probability measure µ a on the compact space σ(a) N , where the label a now refers to the infinite set of commuting operators (a 1 , a 2 , . . .) on H ⊗∞ . To compute this measure, I use (A.12) and the fact that by construction functions of the type 34) where N < ∞ and f (N ) ∈ C(σ(a) N ), are dense in C(σ(a) N ) (with respect to the appropriate supremum-norm), and that in turn finite linear combinations of factorized functions
. It follows from this that
Since this generalizes (A.25) to N = ∞, this finishes the proof of Theorem 5.1. Mises (1919) and by Kolmogorov (1933) . Von Mises was a strict frequentist for whom probability was a derived concept, predicated on first having a good notion of a random sequence from which relative frequencies defining probability could be extracted. Kolmogorov, on the other hand, started from an axiomatic a priori notion of probability from which a suitable mathematical concept of randomness was subsequently to be extracted. Despite the resounding and continuing success of the first step, Kolmogorov's initial failure to achieve the follow-up led to his later notion of algorithmic randomness, which (subject to a technical improvement) was to become one of the three equivalent definitions of 1-randomness. In turn, von Mises's failure to adequately define random sequences eventually led to the other two. 64 Kolmogorov's problem, which was noticed already by Laplace and perhaps even earlier probabilists, was that, specializing to a 50-50 Bernoulli process for simplicity, 65 any binary string σ of length N has probability P (σ) = 2 −N and any (infinite) binary sequence x has probability P (x) = 0, although say σ = 0011010101110100 looks much more random than σ = 111111111111111. In other words, their probabilities say little or nothing about the "randomness" of individual outcomes. Imposing statistical properties helps but is not enough to guarantee randomness. It is slightly easier to explain this in base 10, to which I therefore switch for a moment. If we call a sequence x Borel normal if each possible string σ in x has (asymptotic) frequency 10 −|σ| (so that each digit 0, . . . , 9 occurs 10% of the time, each block 00 to 99 occurs 1% of the time, etc., then Champernowne's number 0123456789101112131415161718192021222324252629282930 . . . can be shown to be Borel normal. The decimal expansion of π is conjectured to be Borel normal, too (and has been empirically verified to be so in billions of decimals), but these numbers are hardly random: they are computable, which is an anti-pole to randomness. Von Mises's problem was that his definition of a random sequence (called a Kollektiv ), despite his great insights, simply did not work. Back to binary sequences, his notion of randomness was supposed to guarantee the existence of limiting relative frequencies (which in turn should define the corresponding single-case probabilities), but of course he understood that a sequence like 01010101 · · · is not very random at all. His idea was that limiting relative frequencies should exist not only for the given sequence, but also for all its permutations defined by so-called place-selection functions, which he tried to find (in vain) by precluding successful gambling strategies on the digits of the sequence. 63 'The investigations on the foundations of geometry suggest the problem to treat in the same manner, by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which already today mathematics plays an important part; in the first rank are the theory of probabilities and mechanics.' See Gorban (2018) for a recent survey. 64 See van Lambalgen (1987) or, for a lighter account, Diaconis & Skyrms (2018) for this history. 65 A string σ is finite row of bits, whereas a sequence x is an infinite one. The length of a string σ is |σ|.
Of the three equivalent definitions of 1-randomness already mentioned in §2, namely:
Incompressibility; Patternlessness; Unpredictability, the first may be said to go back to Kolmogorov's struggle, whereas the other two originate in later attempts by other mathematicians to improve the work of von Mises. 66 Although there isn't a single "correct" mathematical notion of randomness, the notion of 1-randomness featured here stands out (and represents a consensus view) largely because it can be defined in these three equivalent yet fairly different ways, each of which realizes some basic intuition on randomness (of course defined through its obvious anti-pole!).
In what follows, these notions will be defined more precisely, followed by some of their consequences. 67 We assume basic familiarity with the notion of a computable function f : N → N, which may technically be defined through recursion theory or equivalently through Turing machines: a function is computable if it can be computed by a computer.
Incompressibility
The idea is that a string or sequence is random iff its shortest description is the sequence itself, but the notion of a description has to made precise to avoid Berry's paradox :
The Berry number is the smallest positive integer that cannot be described in less than eighteen words.
The paradox, then, is that on the one hand this number must exist, since only finitely many integers can be described in less than eighteen words and hence the set of such numbers must have a lower bound, while on the other hand Berry's number cannot exists by its own definition. This is, of course, one of innumerable paradoxes of natural language, which, like the liar's paradox, will be seen to lead to an incompleteness theorem once the notion of a description has been appropriately formalized in mathematics, as follows. 68 The plain Kolmogorov complexity C(σ) of σ ∈ 2 N is defined as the length (in bits) of the shortest computer program (run on some fixed universal Turing machine U ) that computes σ. The choice of U affects this definition only up to an σ-independent constant. For technical reasons (especially for defining the randomness of sequences) it is preferable to work with prefix-free Turing machines T , whose domain D(T ) consists of a prefixfree subset of 2 * , i.e., if σ ∈ D(T ) then στ / ∈ D(T ) for any σ, τ ∈ 2 * , where στ is the concatenation of σ and τ , as the notation suggests. This is also independent of U up to a constant, and defines the the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity K(σ) as the length of the shortest program (run on some fixed universal prefix-free Turing machine U ) that computes σ. For fixed c ∈ N we then say that σ ∈ 2 * is c-compressible if K(σ) < |σ| − c; of course, this depends on U via K(σ), but nonetheless a simple counting argument shows: 66 As mentioned and referenced in most literature in the next footnote, Kolmogorov's work in the 1960s on the first definition was predated by R. Solomonoff and matched by independent later work of G. Chaitin. Key players around the other definitions were C.P. Schnorr and P. Martin-Löf, respectively. Svozil (1993 Svozil ( , 2018 , Wolf (2015) , and Zurek (1989) for brief introductions to Kolmogorov randomness with applications to physics. 68 We write 2 N for the set of all binary strings σ of length |σ| = N ∈ N, and 2 * = ∪N 2 N for the set of all binary strings. Finally, 2 N denotes the set of all binary sequences x (which are infinite by convention).
At least 2 N − 2 N −c+1 + 1 strings σ of length |σ| = N are not c-compressible.
Clearly, as σ grows and c > 0, these will form the overwhelming majority. Finally, σ is Kolmogorov c-random if it is not c-compressible, i.e., if K(σ) ≥ |σ| − c, and Kolmogorov random if it is not c-compressible for any c, that is, if one even has K(σ) ≥ |σ|. Since K(σ) can at most be equal to the length of an efficient printing program plus the length of σ, this simply means that σ is Kolmogorov random if
where ≈ means 'up to a σ-independent constant'. Finally, if for a sequence x ∈ 2 N I write x |N for its initial segment of length N , then x is Kolmogorov-Chaitin random if
Equivalently, 69 a sequence x is Kolmogorov-Chaitin random if there exists c ∈ N such that each truncation x |N satisfies K(x |N ) ≥ N − c. We may therefore note that randomness of sequences, which I see as idealizations of finite strings, satisfies Earman's principle ( §4). This definition of randomness of both finite strings and infinite sequences looks very appealing, but in a way it is self-defeating, since although it is defined in terms of computability, the complexity function K is not computable, and hence one cannot even determine algorithmically if a finite string σ is random (let alone an infinite one). 70 Moreover, Berry's paradox strikes back through Chaitin's incompleteness Theorem: For any consistent, sound, and sufficiently rich formal system F (containing basic arithmetic) there is a constant f such that the statement K(σ) > f cannot be proved in F for any σ ∈ 2 * , although it is true for all (random) strings σ that satisfy K(σ) ≥ |σ| > f (and there are infinitely many such strings, as the above counting argument shows). To get a very rough idea of proof, let me just say that any proof in F of the sentence K(σ) > f would identify σ and hence give a shorter description of σ than its complexity K(σ) allows.
Chaitin's Theorem gives a new and inexhaustible class of unprovable but true statements (which also lie in a very different class from those provided by Gödel himself):
For almost all random strings their randomness cannot be proved. 71 To the extent that there are deep logico-philosophical truths, surely this is one! Compare: 'It may be taken for granted that any attempt at defining disorder in a formal way will lead to a contradiction. This does not mean that the notion of disorder is contradictory. It is so, however, as soon as I try to formalize it. ' 72 The satisfactory definition of 1-randomness proves this wrong, but the statement preceding it is a correct version of a similar intuition: randomness is by its very nature elusive. 69 See Calude (2010), Theorem 6.38 (attributed to Chaitin) for this equivalence. 70 To see this, identify 2 * ∼ = N (in a computable way of course) and define a function L : N → N by L(n) = min{m ∈ N | K(m) ≥ n}, the shortest string m (seen as an element of N) whose complexity K(m) exceeds n, so that by construction K(L(n)) ≥ n. If K were computable, then so would L be. Suppose T is the shortest prefix-free program that computes L. Since K(L(n)) is the length of shortest prefix-free program that computes L(n), we have K(L(n)) ≤ |n| + |T |, where |n| is the length of σ under the above bijection σ ↔ n, so that |n| ≈ 10log n. Thus n ≤ K(L(n)) ≤ |n| + |T |, which cannot be true for large n.
71 See Raatikainen (1998) for a detailed presentation of Chaitin's incompleteness Theorem including a devastating critique of the far-reaching philosophical interpretation Chaitin himself gave of his theorem. 72 Statement by the influential German-Dutch mathematician and educator Hans Freudenthal from 1969, quoted in both van Lambalgen (1987) 
Patternlessness
This is the most direct attack on the "paradox of probability", which states that each individual sequence has probability zero despite the huge differences in their (true or apparent) "randomness". We use the notation of §4, so that µ ∞ is the probability measure on the set 2 N of all binary sequences induced by the 50-50 measure on the outcome space {0, 1} of a single fair coin flip (the discussion is easily adapted to other cases).
As opposed to single outcomes, a key role will be played by tests, i.e. (measurable) sets T ⊂ 2 N of outcomes for which µ ∞ (T ) = 0. Such a test defines a property that a sequence x ∈ 2 N may or may not have, namely membership of T . Conversely, and perhaps less circularly, one may start with a given pattern that x might have, which would make it appear less random if it had it, and express this pattern as a test T . Conceptually, tests contain outcomes that are supposed to be "atypical", and randomness of x ∈ 2 N will be defined by the property of not belonging to any such test, making x "typical". For example, the property lim N →∞ N −1 N n=1 x n = 1/2 is "typical" for a fair coin flip and indeed (by the strong law of large numbers) it holds with probability 1 (in that the set E of all x for which this limit exists and equals 1/2 has µ ∞ (E) = 1, so that its complement T = 2 N \E has µ ∞ (T ) = 0). One has to proceed very carefully, though, since all singletons T = {x} for x ∈ 2 N are to be excluded; indeed, these all have measure zero and yet, returning to the paradox of probability, some uncontroversially random sequence x (on whatever definition) would fail to be random by the criterion just proposed if all measure zero sets were included in the list of tests. Kolmogorov's former postdoc Martin-Löf (1966) saw his way out of this dilemma, combining techniques from computability/recursion theory with some ideas from the intuitionistic/constructive mathematics of the great L.E.J. Brouwer:
1. One specializes to tests of the form T = ∩ n∈N U n , where U n+1 ⊆ U n and
which guarantees that µ ∞ (T ) = 0. Perhaps the simplest example is not the law of large numbers, for which see Li & Vitányi (2008) , §2.4, Example 2.4.2, but the test where U n consists of all sequences starting with n zeros; clearly, µ ∞ (U n ) = 2 −n . In this case, the test T = {x love } does consist of a singleton x love = 000 · · · (zeros only).
2. Both the sets U n and the map n → U n have to be computable in a suitable sense. 73 3. A sequence x ∈ 2 N is called Martin-Löf random if x / ∈ T for any such test T .
If x / ∈ T , one says that x passes the test T . Note that the computability requirement implies that the set of all tests T satisfying these two criteria is countable, which fact by itself already shows what a huge cut in the set of all measure-zero sets has been achieved. 74 It should be clear that this definition makes no sense if the sample space is finite, but in order to adhere to Earman's principle one could still check to what extent randomness of sequences is determined by their finite initial segments. This is indeed the case, as follows from the detailed structure of the admissible sets U n above (see footnote 73). 73 First, each Un has to be open in 2 N , which means that Un = ∪σ∈V n N (σ), where Vn ⊂ 2 * and N (σ) = {σy | y ∈ 2 N } consists of all sequences x = σy that start with the given finite part σ. Second, each Vn must be countable, so that Vn = ∪mσ (n,m) , where each σ (n,m) ∈ 2 * . Finally, there must be a single program enumerating the sets (Vn), so that all in all one requires a (partial) computable function σ : N × N → 2 * such that Un = ∪mN (σ (n,m) ) and hence T = ∩n ∪m N (σ (n,m) ). Such a set T is called effective, and if also (B.3) holds, then T is an effective measure zero set or Martin-Löf test. 74 There is even a single "universal" Martin-Löf test U such that x / ∈ U iff x is Martin-Löf random.
Unpredictability
Unpredictability is formalized as the impossibility of a successful betting strategy on the successive digits of a random sequence x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .). in which case the punter beats the casino. 75 Our first impulse would now be to call x ∈ 2 N random if there exists no martingale that succeeds on A = {x}, but, as shown by Ville (1939) , this property captures something seen before, crucially different from randomness:
Let A ⊂ 2 N . Then µ ∞ (A) = 0 if and only if there exists a martingale that succeeds on A.
Of course, A should be measurable. In particular, for any sequence x ∈ 2 N there exists a martingale that succeeds on x, and hence no sequence x would be random on the criterion that no martingale succeeds on it. Fortunately, the previous two definitions of randomness suggest that all that is missing is a suitable notion of computability for martingales. This notion was provided by Schnorr (1971) : all that needs to be added is that the class of martingales d that succeed on A be uniformly left computably enumerable, in the sense that firstly each real number d(σ) is the limit of a computable increasing sequence of rational numbers, and secondly that there is a single program that computes d(σ) in that way. Defining x ∈ 2 N to be Schnorr random if there exists no uniformly left computably enumerable martingale that succeeds on it, 76 one has the crowning theorem on 1-randomness: Theorem B.1 A sequence x ∈ 2 N is Kolmogorov-Chaitin random iff it is Martin-Löf random and iff it is Schnorr random (and these equivalent conditions define 1-randomness).
Thus the criteria of incompressibility (Kolmogorov-Chaitin), patternlessness (MartinLöf), and unpredictability (Schnorr) for randomness coincide, which is truly remarkable. 77 75 In practice someone beating the casino will go home with a finite amount of money. The fact that the right-hand side of (B.8) is infinite is the result of idealizing long strings by sequences: if the punter has a uniform winning strategy and places infinitely many bets, he will earn an infinite amount of money. 76 In the literature the term 'Schnorr randomness' is often used differently, namely to indicate that the martingales d in the above definition are merely computable, which yields a weaker notion of randomness. Also, note that Schnorr (1971) used so-called supermartingales in his definition, for which one has ≤ instead of equality in (B.5), but martingales also work, cf. Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010), Theorem 6.3.4. 77 The equivalence between the criteria of Martin-Löf and of Kolmogorov-Chaitin was proved by Chaitin (cf. Calude, 2010, Theorem 6.35) and by Schnorr (1973) . The equivalence between Martin-Löf and Schnorr is due to Schnorr (1971) 
Some reflections on 1-randomness
Any sound definition of randomness (for binary sequences) has to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis: if the definition is too weak (such as Borel normality), counterexamples will undermine it (such as Champernowne's number), but if it is too strong, it will not hold almost surely in a 50-50 Bernoulli process. 78 In this respect 1-randomness does very well: see Theorem 4.1 and the theorem below (which lies at the basis of Corollary 4.2):
Theorem B.2 Any 1-random sequence is Borel normal, incomputable, and contains any finite string infinitely often. 79 In fact, since I sometimes use computability as a mathematical metaphor for determinism, it is worth mentioning that 1-random sequences are incomputable in a very strong sense: each 1-random sequence x is immune in the sense that neither the set {n ∈ N | x n = 1} nor its complement {n ∈ N | x n = 0} is computably enumerable (c.e.), or can even contain an infinite c.e. subset. Thus 1-randomness is far stronger than mere incomputability (or perhaps indeterminism), so that the numerous theorems in the literature that show, on the basis of either Bell's Theorem or the Kochen-Specker Theorem, that measurement outcome sequences cannot be computable fall far short of the real goal of proving that they are 1-random; see Kamminga (2019) and references therein for a survey.
Furthermore, 1-randomness is a tail property: adding any finite segment to x, or deleting any finite part from it, or altering any finite number of digits in x, does not affect its property of being 1-random (Calude, 2010, Theorem 6.40). 80 Finally, it would be interesting to compare 1-random sequences with Brouwer's choice sequences from intuitionistic mathematics, especially (in the light of our anti-polar concept of randomness of §2) the "lawless" ones. 81 Von Mises (1919) mentioned choice sequences as an inspiration for his idea of a Kollektiv (van Lambalgen, 1996) , but as far as I know little has been done with this idea in the modern setting. See also Gisin (2018) .
